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Runeson, Juslin, and Olsson (2000) proposed (a) that perceptual learning entails a
transition from an inferential to a direct-perceptual mode of apprehension, and (b)
that relative confidence—the difference between estimated and actual perfor-
mance—indicates whether apprehension is inferential or direct. In 3 experiments
participants received feedback on judgments of force; the results replicated Runeson
et al.’s observed decrease in overconfidence but showed more overconfidence. Rela-
tive confidence depended on how performance was defined. An attempt to manipu-
late confidence failed, but trait confidence affected relative confidence. It was con-
cluded that overconfidence does not necessarily signal inferential functioning and
that a decrease in overconfidence might occur in a direct-perceptual mode. A theory
of learning within the direct-perceptual mode, in addition to learning through a
mode transition, appears necessary.
The ecological approach in psychology has characterized perceptual learning in
terms of differentiation (Gibson & Gibson, 1955) and the education of attention to
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information—variables detectable in energy fluxes that specify properties of the
perceiver’s environment (Gibson, 1966). One elaboration of that theory (Jacobs &
Michaels, 2002, 2006) proposes that learning is itself an informationally guided
process of traversing an information manifold to a locus that permits the meeting of
task demands. The approach assumes that all the while, perception is direct; that
is, unmediated and noninferential. A different form of perceptual learning, the
mode transition, has been proposed by Runeson, Juslin, and Olsson (2000). These
authors argued, “Competence entails the use of advanced kinematic information
in a direct-perceptual (‘sensory’) mode of apprehension, in contrast to beginners’
use of simpler cues in an inferential (‘cognitive’) mode of apprehension” (p. 525).
In other words, performance is said to improve because perceivers graduate from
an inferential to a direct-perceptual mode of apprehension. In this article, we in-
vestigate the mode transition hypothesis and the measures that evidence its occur-
rence.
Historically, inferential perception and direct perception have been considered
to be alternative theoretical positions. Indirect perceptionists have asserted that
perception is inferential; ecological perceptionists have asserted that perception is
direct. A first difference between inferential and direct perception is that inferen-
tial perception is associated with the use of simple variables that are ambiguous
with respect to properties to be perceived. The assumption of stimulus ambiguity
lays a basis for the claim that properties of interest are inferred from these so-called
elementary properties. Adherents of direct perception, on the other hand, expect
observers to use analytically complex variables that specify to-be-perceived proper-
ties, where specification obviates the need for inference. Runeson et al. (2000)
took as one line of evidence in favor of the mode transition hypothesis that, before
practice, judgments of novices are often based on variables that correlate only mar-
ginally with the to-be-perceived kinetic property but that, after a minimal amount
of practice, judgments come to be based on more advanced information. Analo-
gous findings have been reported in a number of other studies (Jacobs, Michaels, &
Runeson, 2000; Jacobs, Runeson, & Michaels, 2001; Michaels & de Vries, 1998).
A second line of support for the mode transition hypothesis is provided by the
degree of confidence expressed by observers (Runeson et al., 2000). Differences in
confidence judgments have historically been shown to be based on whether a task
is sensory or cognitive. A typical sensory task, for instance, would be to judge which
of two line segments is the longer, and a typical cognitive task would be to estimate
whether France or Nigeria has the larger population. Sensory tasks appear to be
characterized by underconfidence—perceivers report that they are performing
more poorly than they are, in fact, performing (Juslin & Olsson, 1997). Relative
confidence is defined as the difference between the percentage of judgments that
are actually correct and the percentage of judgments estimated to be correct by the
perceiver. In contrast, cognitive tasks appear to be characterized by overconfidence
or well calibrated confidence (e.g., Juslin & Olsson, 1997; see also Baranski &
Petrusic, 1999, for a contrary view). Runeson et al. reasoned that confidence judg-




































































ments might, therefore, be a useful index of whether observers perform a task in a
direct-perceptual (“sensory”) mode or an inferential (“cognitive”) mode. In their
colliding-balls experiment, Runeson et al. reported that confidence judgments of
novices tended to be well calibrated, whereas when the novices became experts,
they tended to be underconfident. This supports the mode transition theory be-
cause it seems to indicate that performance became less often inferential and more
often direct perceptual.
The need for an ecological learning theory has been emphasized (e.g., Michaels
& Beek, 1995), and the mode transition hypothesis might be a major breakthrough
in that respect. Furthermore, the issue of mode transition is central to debates on
direct versus inferential processing (or direct perception versus heuristics; e.g.,
Gilden & Proffitt, 1989, 1994; Runeson, 1995; Runeson & Vedeler, 1993). As
pointed out by Runeson et al. (2000), previous results might have contained a mix-
ture of inferential and direct-perceptual performance, thereby complicating their
interpretation. Additional empirical evidence on the nature of the two modes and
the transition is therefore desirable (cf. Andersson, Kreegipuu, & Runeson, 2001;
Kreegipuu & Runeson, 1999). This contribution aims to provide such further evi-
dence. We exploited a variation on a paradigm used by Michaels and de Vries
(1998); participants observed a stick figure executing a bimanual pull (see Figure 1
for a static image from the displays) and were asked to judge the relative pulling
force.
The pull-perception task is suited for our purpose for three reasons. First, as is
relative mass, relative force is a kinetic (or dynamic) property. Because the optic
array comprises only kinematic variables (e.g., velocities and angles), kinematic
variables must lay the basis for the perception of kinetic properties. Relative pulling
force has been shown to be specified by kinematic patterns (Michaels & de Vries,
1998), which provides perceivers with the opportunity to detect such information
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FIGURE 1 The starting and ending configuration of the stick figure puller used in all experi-




































































and, thus, to apprehend relative pulling force in a direct-perceptual mode. Second,
Michaels and de Vries showed that observers often begin with less useful variables
but converge on more useful variables if given practice with feedback. Finally, dy-
namic pulling is easy to simulate; the center-of-mass motion of human pullers can
be described well using a model with only a few degrees of freedom (Michaels &
Lee, 1996; Michaels, Lee, & Pai, 1993). We used this model to generate cen-
ter-of-mass motions of the stick figure pullers. Given various constraints (constant
elbow and ankle positions), the center-of-mass positions are uniquely related to
limb positions, and the center-of-mass motions can easily be transformed into stick
figure motions.
Researchhas shownthatbothspecifyingandnonspecifyingvariablesplayarole in
the perception of pulling force; the implicated nonspecifying variables are maximal
displacement and maximal speed of the puller’s center of mass (Michaels & de Vries,
1998). The particular variables that are exploited depend on the relative usefulness
ofvariables,whichcanbemeasuredas thecorrelationsbetweenrelativepulling force
and the nonspecifying variables. These correlations depend on the characteristics of
the particular set of pulls, which depend, in turn, on which model parameters are ma-
nipulated to generate the set of pulls. For Experiment 4 of Michaels and de Vries and
the experiments reported here, the correlation between a force-specifying invariant
and maximal displacement was –.05, and the correlation between the force-specify-
ing invariant and maximal speed was .74 (the intercorrelation of speed and displace-
ment was .62). The rationale for choosing this particular set of stimuli was twofold.
First, keeping the correlations among the kinematic variables as low as possible
would, we hoped, not inadvertently result in good feedback when the observer is us-
ing a nonspecifying variable. Second and relatedly, this set has been shown to en-
courageperceivers toconvergeonhigher-order specifyingvariables (cf.Experiments
3 and 4 of Michaels & de Vries, 1998). We expected that this set of displays would be
suited to our purpose, and we therefore used it in all experiments and in all phases of
the experiments (i.e., pretest, practice, and posttest).1
EXPERIMENT 1
As described previously, Runeson et al. (2000) demonstrated changes in variable
use and a decrease in relative confidence in a paradigm in which perceivers esti-
mated the relative mass of colliding balls. Convergence on more useful variables
was also evident in the perception of pulling force (Michaels & de Vries, 1998).
Here we attempt to replicate the decrease in confidence in the latter paradigm.
Runeson et al. asked observers to make binary judgments; more precisely, they
asked observers to indicate which of two colliding balls was the heavier. We also
70 HAJNAL ET AL.
1Experiments 1 and 2 are, in fact, replications of experiments presented in Jacobs (2001, chap. 4);




































































asked participants to make binary judgments, first to make the experiment similar
to Runeson et al.’s experiment, and second because binary judgments are more ap-
propriate than quantitative judgments if one also solicits confidence judgments.
We therefore used the classic psychophysical method of constant stimuli, in which
participants are asked to categorize each display with reference to a standard. The
standard was not explicitly presented; participants were to judge whether the force
on a particular pull was above or below the average of all forces in the collection of
displays. This is a commonly used technique in visual psychophysics (e.g., McKee,
1981; Regan & Hamstra, 1993; Regan & Vincent, 1995).
Method
Participants. Eight undergraduate students at the University of Connecti-
cut participated. They received credit in partial fulfillment of their introductory
psychology course’s experimental requirement.
Displays and design. The center-of-mass motions of the stick figure display
were based on the three dynamic parameters of the model of center-of-mass mo-
tions in bimanual pulling of Michaels and Lee (1996): slack, stiffness, and torque.
The model consists of a mass, m, on an inverted pendulum, as depicted in Figure 2.
The pendulum is attached to a vertical support by an initially slack elastic cord
(Figure 2, Panel A). A constant torque and, after initiation, also a torque caused by
gravity accelerate the mass away from its initial upright position until the cord is
stretched (Figure 2, Panel B). The stiffness of the cord then decelerates the pendu-
lum until it reaches the position of maximal displacement (Figure 2, Panel C),
where the stiffness reverses the motion of the pendulum, eventually leading it back
to its initial position. Thus, the motion of a pendulum of a particular mass and
length is determined by three model parameters: a constant torque, the initial slack
of the cord, and the stiffness of the cord.
We created 36 simulations—of bimanual pulls on a horizontal bar at elbow
height—by manipulating two of the model’s three parameters. Stiffness and torque
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had six levels each (6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21 kN/m and moment arms of 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12
cm, respectively). Slack was constant at 7 cm. In all trials the length of the pendu-
lum was 90 cm and the mass of the bob was 75 kg. The stick figures on the screen
were 7 cm tall, about 25 times smaller than the pullers whose motion was simu-
lated. The stick figures were presented as white lines on a black background, in a
simulation window of about 10 × 10 cm (350 × 350 pixels), on a Macintosh CRT
monitor at its refresh rate of 75 Hz. Using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard,
1997; Pelli, 1997) within a Matlab program, we made sure that the animations of
the stick figures were tightly synchronized with the buildup of the computer screen.
Participants viewed the animations from a distance of approximately 40 cm.
The experiment consisted of a 36-trial pretest, four 36-trial practice blocks, and
a 36-trial posttest. Each block comprised the 36 displays in completely randomized
order.
Procedure. Participants started a series of trials by placing the cursor and
clicking on a start button with a computer mouse. After each display generated by a
given set of simulation values was presented three times in rapid succession, a re-
sponse window appeared on the screen. Using the mouse, participants entered two
judgments: a binary judgment about whether the peak force exerted by the puller
was above or below the average of all pulls, which was entered by clicking on one of
two buttons; and a quantitative judgment, entered on a slider ranging from 50% to
100%: “Placing the slider at the 50% end means that your force judgment is a ran-
dom choice … placing the slider at the 100% end means that you are sure that your
force judgment is correct.” Participants were free to change their judgments until
they clicked the ready button. In the pretest and posttest, the ready button initiated
a new trial. On practice trials, clicking the ready button was followed by feedback:
The message correct or incorrect appeared on the screen, depending on whether or
not the participant had correctly judged that the pulling force was above or below
average. Each session lasted about 1.5 to 2 hr.
Results and Discussion
On average, 61% of the force judgments were correct in the pretest and 81% of
judgments were correct in the posttest. Participants were able to perform the task,
and they improved after practice with feedback. A paired t test on the percentages
of correct judgments in the pretest and posttest indicated that the improvement
was significant, t(7) = 3.03, p < .02, one-tailed. The point biserial correlation be-
tween judgment and force increased from .199 on the pretest to .639 on the
posttest, on average; a t test on these correlations2 showed a significant improve-
ment, t(7) = 3.44, p < .01, one-tailed.
72 HAJNAL ET AL.





































































As to the main question of whether relative confidence, the difference between
average confidence and percentage correct, decreased with practice, we found that
it did so systematically over blocks of trials, from 15.8% in the pretest to 2.4 % in
the posttest. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Block (1 to 6) as a
within-subjects factor showed that the decrease was significant, F(5, 35) = 2.28, p
= .035, again one-tailed. In line with the mode transition hypothesis, we replicated
a decrease in relative confidence.
Both the performance and relative confidence scores are presented by individual
participants inTable1.Sixoutof8participants exhibitedadecrease in relativeconfi-
dence. Half of the participants became underconfident in the posttest, whereas the
rest remained overconfident. The standard deviation of relative confidence de-
creased from 15.7% in the pretest to 8.9% in the posttest, suggesting that over partic-
ipants, confidence judgments became more consistent. The difference between pre-
and posttest scores was 13.4% on average, with a large standard deviation of 19.7%.
These results reflect large individual differences among participants.
To summarize, this experiment replicated the decrease in relative confidence re-
ported by Runeson et al. (2000). We, however, found more overconfidence: With
practice, our participants changed from overconfidence to near well calibrated con-
fidence, whereas participants in the experiments of Runeson et al. changed from well
calibrated confidence to underconfidence (more precisely, from 0% to –11% under-
confidence). The next experiment addresses an explanation of the decrease in confi-
dence that is invited by the higher level of confidence in our experiment.
EXPERIMENT 2
The fact that we observed overconfidence even in the posttest of Experiment 1,
whereas Runeson et al. (2000) observed underconfidence, might have been due to
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TABLE 1
Performance and Relative Confidence for Individuals in Experiment 1
% Correct Relative Confidence
Participant Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest
1 66.7 91.7 4.0 –2.1
2 66.7 91.7 3.7 –11.6
3 75.0 80.6 4.8 12.6
4 42.9 85.7 29.9 –1.6
5 69.4 80.6 11.5 4.1
6 33.3 78.8 48.5 –3.1
7 63.9 75.0 13.6 5.6
8 72.2 63.9 10.4 15.6
M 61.3 81.0 15.8 2.4




































































the more frequent use of an inferential mode by our observers which, in turn, might
have been due to the use of nonspecifying variables in the case of our observers or
to differences in simulation techniques and display qualities (Runeson &
Andersson, 2004). More interesting, however, is that the larger overconfidence in-
vites an alternative view of the origin of the decrease in overconfidence. Assume
that confidence always reflects the accuracy with which the exploited variable is
detected, whatever that variable may be. Imagine further two perceivers who ex-
press an equal absolute confidence in their detection of their exploited optical vari-
ables. Say that one participant uses a nonspecifying variable; this would affect per-
formance, but not confidence. Such a perceiver would show overconfidence
because performance is less accurate than the confidence. The second perceiver,
who detects a specifying variable with the same degree of accuracy, would perform
better relative to the experimenters’ intended quantity. When that better perfor-
mance is compared with the same confidence, there would be less overconfidence
than shown by the first perceiver. Applying this logic to our Experiment 1, most
overconfidence was found in the pretest—namely because novices are more likely
to use nonspecifying variables. Under this interpretation, overconfidence would be
due to the fact that the performance measure is not a measure of what participants are ac-
tually doing.
If, indeed, overconfidence is due to reliance on nonspecifying variables, rather
than to a different kind of cognitive process, an apparent decrease of overconfi-
dence, as observed in Experiment 1, might be due to convergence on specifying
variables. This reasoning led to the expectation that overconfidence, as mea-
sured here, should increase if perceivers are induced to rely more on non-
specifying variables. To test this, we adopted the methods of Experiment 5 of
Michaels and de Vries (1998), which showed that perceivers’ reliance on non-
specifying variables could be attained through feedback contingent on such vari-
ables. In Experiment 2, we made feedback contingent on often-used non-
specifying variables. For a first group of participants, the displacement group,
feedback “on accuracy” was contingent on the maximal displacement of the
puller’s center of mass. For a second group, the speed group, feedback was con-
tingent on maximal speed. To the extent that categorical feedback is also effec-
tive in inducing reattunement (Michaels & de Vries, 1998, had used scalar feed-
back), we expected that these groups would show an increase in overconfidence.
It is more likely that an effect would be observed with displacement because
speed was highly correlated with relative pulling force (r = .74). Feedback con-
tingent on speed, therefore, may be the same as feedback contingent on force in
a large percentage of trials.
In summary, participants who receive feedback based on nonspecifying vari-
ables are hypothesized to show an increase in overconfidence. This is in contrast to
participants in Experiment 1, who received feedback on force and exhibited a de-
crease in overconfidence.





































































As in Experiment 1, participants were instructed to judge peak force and to give con-
fidence estimates. The same pretest-practice-posttest design was used. Also as in Ex-
periment 1, participants were instructed to judge relative pulling force. Feedback,
however, was based on the maximal speed of the puller’s center of mass for the speed
group and on the maximal displacement of the center of mass for the displacement
group.Thismeans, for instance, thata responseofbelowaveragewassaid tobecorrect
if maximal speed or maximal displacement, respectively, was less than average. The
speed group and the displacement group each had 8 participants. Perceivers in both
groups were instructed to enter their answer and confidence judgment with respect
to force. They were told that they would receive feedback on their performance in
the training blocks, but the nature of the feedback was not revealed. In all other re-
gards, the experiment was the same as Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
We divide our results into three sections, each adopting a different definition of
performance accuracy. In the first section we define performance as we had in Ex-
periment 1, in terms of the accuracy of judging pulling force. In the second section,
performance is defined relative to the feedback conditions that distinguished
groups. In the third section we introduce the idea of an intrinsic performance mea-
sure. In all three sections, to facilitate comparisons with Experiment 1, those data
are included as a third condition, in which force feedback was given.
Force-referential performance. Remember that our hypothesis consisted of
two parts: Participants would converge on nonspecifying variables on which they
received feedback, and, as a result, overconfidence would increase. We address
these issues in turn.
If participants indeed converged on variables on which they received feedback,
the force, speed and displacement groups should differ in which variable they ex-
ploited in the posttest—the force group (Experiment 1) relying more on a specify-
ing variable, the speed group relying more on maximal speed, and the displacement
group relying more on maximal displacement. The r2 of the correlations relating
judgments to each of the kinematic variables are presented by group and blocks of
trials in Figure 3.
Inspection of Figure 3 shows again that in the force-feedback condition (i.e.,
Experiment 1) judgments came to correlate more highly with actual force (top
panel) than did the judgments of members of the other groups. A Group (force
feedback, speed feedback, and displacement feedback) × Block repeated measures
ANOVA on the correlations between judgments and force showed that the differ-
ence between feedback groups on the judgment–force rs was significant, F(2, 21)




































































= 10.02, p < .001, revealing the superiority of the force group. The middle panel
hints that a possible increase in the correlation of judgment and displacement oc-
curs only in the group given displacement feedback; however, an ANOVA on dis-
placement–judgment correlations yielded no significant differences among groups.
The bottom panel seems to show that both the speed and force groups showed in-
creasing correlation with speed. An ANOVA on the judgment–speed correlation
revealed higher correlations for the speed and force groups than for the displace-
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FIGURE 3 Average squares of correlations between candidate variable and binary judgments
over blocks for the three feedback groups. In the top panel, the candidate variable is force; in the




































































ment group, F(2, 21) = 7.4, p < .004. That both force and speed groups show high
speed–judgment correlations is not surprising given the high correlation between
force and speed.
The way the results were plotted in Figure 3, although making the previously
discussed characteristics clear, obscures other characteristics. Comparing the val-
ues for the force group in the top and bottom panels, for instance, reveals that the
correlation between force and judgment was consistently smaller than the correla-
tion between speed and judgment. This suggests that convergence on a specifying
variable was perhaps thwarted by the high correlation between force and speed.
Second, a comparison of all sets of correlations in the displacement group showed a
slight systematic superiority of the displacement–judgment correlations over the
velocity–judgment correlations and a huge superiority of the displacement–judg-
ment correlations over the force–judgment correlations. But still the judg-
ment–displacement r2s in this group were never higher than .6. Thus, it seems that
the displacement feedback, although preventing participants from relying on
force-specifying information, did not induce systematic reliance on displacement.
Again, the benefit of feedback on displacement seemed to spill over onto speed,
presumably due to the fairly high intercorrelation of displacement and speed.
In sum, the feedback contingent on the different nonspecifying variables ap-
peared to foster reliance on the different nonspecifying variables, although the ef-
fects were neither as strong nor as reliable as those that had been reported when
scalar, rather than categorical, feedback was offered (Michaels & de Vries, 1998,
Experiment 5).
We now turn to the second part of our hypothesis, which predicted that a con-
vergence on nonspecifying variables in the speed and displacement groups would
result in an increase in overconfidence. The left half of Table 2 presents the per-
centages of trials in which participants correctly judged force in the pretest and
posttest, along with their average relative confidence. A Group (force feedback,
speed feedback, and displacement feedback) × Block (pretest, posttest) ANOVA
on relative confidence revealed a significant Group × Block interaction, F(2, 21)
= 4.27, p = .028; as expected, the force group showed a decrease in relative confi-
dence, whereas the speed and displacement groups showed an apparent increase
MODES AND VARIABLES 77
TABLE 2
Average Performance and Relative Confidence by Groups in Experiment 2
Force-Referential Feedback-Referential
% Correct Relative Confidence % Correct Relative Confidence
Group Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest
Force 61.3 81.0 15.8 2.4 61.3 81.0 15.8 2.4
Speed 64.9 69.4 15.5 20.1 72.6 77.8 7.9 11.8




































































from pretest to posttest. There was also a marginally significant main effect of
group, F(2, 21) = 3.35, p = .055; the force condition tended to have lower relative
confidence than did the speed and displacement groups.
In short, we found that Experiment 1’s decrease in relative confidence was lim-
ited to the condition in which feedback was based on force. In conditions in which
participants were encouraged to rely on other variables, they did so, and their rela-
tive confidence increased. This is in contrast to the results in the colliding-balls
paradigm reported by Runeson and Andersson (2004): Although their r2 values re-
flect the same kind of influence of feedback as in our study, namely, participants’
judgments appear to correlate highly with the variable on which they received
feedback, relative confidence decreased in all three feedback conditions. Contra-
dictory empirical results from the pulling-force paradigm and the colliding-balls
paradigm undermine the role of relative confidence as an indicator of mode of ap-
prehension.
Feedback-referential performance. Previously, performance, and hence
relative confidence, was defined relative to the explicit task demand of judging
force. Whereas this is a straightforward choice when force feedback is given, the
speed feedback and displacement feedback redefine the task demands. Although
participants were instructed to report force, the feedback indicated that force was
related to kinematic variables that, in fact, did not correlate highly with the simu-
lated force. In this section, we reconsider performance by defining it with respect to
the task demands created by the feedback. Under the new definition, percentage of
correct judgments in the speed group is defined with respect to speed, and percent-
age of correct judgments in the displacement group is defined with respect to dis-
placement. The results so defined are presented in the right half of Table 2.
Feedback-referential performance improved over blocks, as already implied by
the changing correlations depicted in Figure 3: A Block (pretest, posttest) ×
Group (force feedback, speed feedback, and displacement feedback) ANOVA on
percentage correct showed a significant effect of block, F(1, 21) = 12.49, p = .002;
performance improved over blocks. The Block × Group interaction, F(2, 21) =
3.73, p = .04, showed that performance in the force group improved more than in
the other groups. Clearly, speed and displacement feedback were not as effective as
force feedback in drawing participants to rely on these variables. The modest im-
provement in the speed and displacement groups might be partially attributable to
the instructions to report force. Also, given the intercorrelation between the two
variables, the categorical feedback would be the same for the two feedback criteria
in the majority of trials.
A Block × Group ANOVA on the relative confidence using the feed-
back-referential definition of performance revealed only a significant interaction,
F(2, 21) = 3.67, p = .04; the force condition showed a large decrease in relative
confidence, whereas the speed and displacement groups continued to show an
increase in relative confidence. We had expected the same degree of learning in




































































the three groups and, therefore, the same decrease in relative confidence. Al-
though we did not find that equivalent decrease, it is clear from a comparison of
columns 4 and 8 of Table 2 that the overconfidence in the speed and displace-
ment conditions was significantly less than what was obtained through the
force-referential measure on these groups, as demonstrated by the significant in-
teraction in a Block (pretest, posttest) × Method (force referential, feedback ref-
erential) ANOVA, F(1, 30) = 5.52, p < .026.
Our analyses of feedback-referential performance led us to conclude that degree
of overconfidence depends in part on one’s definition of performance. Note, too,
that none of our groups demonstrated underconfidence, Runeson et al.’s (2000)
hallmark of direct perception. In the next subsection, we examine whether an even
more intrinsic performance measure will reveal such underconfidence.
Intrinsic performance. The just-presented analysis supposes that a partici-
pant’s judgment about confidence is in terms of his or her judgment about perfor-
mance. Thus, a determination of underconfidence or overconfidence must take
into account what the participant is doing. Force-referential performance was de-
fined in terms of explicit task demands (“judge force”), whereas feedback-referen-
tial performance was defined relative to implicit task demands. In this section, we
go even further in seeking an intrinsic measure of participant performance.
For Table 2 we had defined performance and relative confidence in terms of
feedback; Table 3 presents analogous results, but in terms of the variables that ap-
peared to be exploited by a participant on the block in question. So for example,
the speed–pretest performance cell of Table 3 is the average of all participants who
appeared to base their judgments on speed on that block, as evidenced by a higher
percentage correct relative to speed than relative to force or displacement. Simi-
larly, participants in the force–posttest cell had higher percentages correct relative
to force than relative to speed or displacement. Put another way, our intrinsic mea-
sure of performance is operationalized as the best performance relative to the three
variables in question and irrespective of explicit instructions or feedback group
membership. Note that a participant can be in one row for the pretest and another
row for the posttest.
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TABLE 3
Average Performance and Relative Confidence in Experiment 2
Using Exploited Variable as Standard
% Correct Relative Confidence
Exploited Variable Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest
Force 73.6 87.4 7.6 –2.8
Speed 76.2 79.4 3.0 6.7




































































A Variable (force, speed, displacement) × Block (pretest, posttest) ANOVA on
intrinsic percentage correct from pretest to posttest showed a significant increase,
F(1, 42) = 11.71, p < .001. The same ANOVA on intrinsic relative confidence re-
vealednosignificanteffects.The lackof significantdifferences inrelativeconfidence
suggests that this measure does not discriminate among groups based on which vari-
able was exploited. More specifically, the lack of an effect suggests that intrinsic rela-
tiveconfidencemaynotalwaysbediagnosticof theuseofaparticularkindofvariable
or mode of apprehension. In our view, the finding that a decrease in confidence can
disappear when analyzed with intrinsic measures should be seriously taken into ac-
count if one uses confidence measures to distinguish perceptual modes.
Let us turn finally to the performance of individuals. Both the intrinsic perfor-
mance and relative confidence scores are presented by participants in Table 4; it
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TABLE 4
Performance and Relative Confidence for Individuals in Experiment 2
Using Exploited Variable as Standard
Feedback
Group/Participant
Intrinsic % Correct Intrinsic Relative Confidence
Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest
Force
1 72.2 91.7 –1.5a –2.1
2 72.2 91.7 –1.8a –11.6
3 86.1 86.1 –6.3a 7.1a
4 60.0 85.7 12.8b –1.6
5 75.0 80.6 5.9a 4.1
6 63.3 84.8 18.5b –9.1a
7 75.0 86.1 25.0a –5.5a
8 83.3 80.6 –.7a –1.1a
Speed
9 72.2 77.8 .8a 10.3a
10 69.4 75.0 9.7b 20.7a
11 66.7 75.0 26.2a 18.5a
12 77.8 77.8 13.5a 9.3b
13 75.0 75.0 9.8 15.4a
14 77.8 80.6 –12.1a 10.8a
15 72.2 77.8 2.4b 10.9a
16 69.4 83.3 6.9a –4.4a
Displacement
17 77.8 88.9 5.8b 2.4b
18 63.9 75.0 –12.3a –3.3a
19 77.1 72.2 –2.9b 12.1b
20 75.0 57.1 –4.8a 21.3a
21 58.3 60.0 14.3a –5.1a
22 55.6 77.8 –4.6b 10.2b
23 57.1 52.8 14.0a 19.1a
24 63.9 72.2 5.5 1.9a




































































conveys a picture somewhat different from that of Table 3, which suggests that
underconfidence appears only in the group that received force-based feedback. Ta-
ble 4 reveals that relative confidence shows large individual differences. Of impor-
tance, some participants who exploit variables other than force also exhibit
underconfidence. Negative relative confidences that bear the superscipts a or b in
Table 4 are blocks on which underconfidence was seen when the participant’s judg-
ment was not based on specifying information. Thus, at the level of the individual,
at least, underconfidence is clearly not diagnostic of exploiting specifying informa-
tion in a perceptual mode.
EXPERIMENT 3
The confidence displayed by participants in a task such as ours is presumably due
not only to how well they assess their own performance. Another factor that is
likely to influence confidence is the feedback provided by the experimenter. The
participant who is told that he or she is correct on 90% of the trials would presum-
ably be more confident than the one who is told of being correct on 60% of trials, ir-
respective of their actual performance. For example, the overconfidence that par-
ticipants display when they use the wrong variable in a perceptual judgment is
likely to be decreased by feedback that performance is poor. The possible use of
confidence judgments as indication of mode of apprehension makes it interesting
to know what other factors contribute to confidence judgments.
To test the extent to which confidence judgments depend on the given feed-
back, we contrived in Experiment 3 a situation in which the feedback on force dif-
fered between two groups. In particular, the criterion for what constituted a correct
response was modified so as to increase the percentage of “correct” judgments in
one group (the encouraged group) and to decrease it in another group (the discour-
aged group). Encouraging feedback might increase absolute confidence, whereas
discouraging feedback might decrease it, both independently of actual perfor-
mance. Such a change in absolute confidence, in turn, would be reflected in rela-
tive confidence measures.
Method
Sixteen new participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups. The 36 vi-
sual displays presented were identical to those of Experiment 1, and as in Experi-
ment 1, only force feedback was given. The simulated forces ranged from 329 to
864 N, and participants were again to indicate whether a given force was above or
below the average force in the group. However, rather than basing the feedback on
the actual mean (583 N), which would have yielded correct feedback for the par-
ticipants, judgments regarding the forces near the mean force (552–621 N) were
always indicated to be correct to the encouraged group, and to be incorrect to the
discouraged group, irrespective of the participants’ judgment. This swing set com-




































































prised 8 out of 36 displays in each block of trials; thus, if participants in the two
conditions were judging at random, the encouraged group would get positive feed-
back on 61% of trials, whereas the discouraged group would get positive feedback
on only 39% of trials. If participants in the two groups always correctly categorized
the pulls, the encouraged group would get positive feedback on 100% of trials,
whereas the discouraged group would get positive feedback on only 78% of the
trials.
Results and Discussion
Before examining the confidence judgments, let us examine performance in the
categorization task. Again we include in our analysis the data from Experiment
1, which we now label the accurate feedback condition. We first asked whether
participants differed in their force-judgment performance. A Block × Group
ANOVA on percentage correct judgments revealed only one significant effect,
that of block; the percentage correct categorization increased monotonically
over blocks from 63.4% correct to 77.2% correct, F(5, 105) = 8.87, p < .001.
Feedback groups showed no effect on participants’ success in judging force. The
averages are plotted in Figure 4.
As to relative confidence judgments, a Block × Group ANOVA on the rela-
tive confidence in the force-referential definition of performance revealed only a
significant decrease over blocks of trials, F(5, 105) = 5.172, p < .001. The feed-
back groups did not differ, as is clear from Figure 5. Figure 5 also shows that the
decrease in relative confidence did not result in underconfidence. This observa-
tion prompted us to consider once again an intrinsic dependent variable as a
measure of performance. An ANOVA on the relative confidence intrinsically
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FIGURE 4 Percentage of correct judgments over blocks of trials for the encouraged, discour-




































































defined also failed to reveal an effect involving feedback group, although predict-
ably, relative confidence was lower.
We conclude that quality of (erroneous) feedback did not have the predicted ef-
fect on confidence. Rather than influencing confidence judgments, the feedback
may have influenced how they performed the task (e.g., what variable they ex-
ploited). We had hoped that giving false feedback only on trials very close to the
mean force would have had little effect on performance, but it seems to have been
used as genuine feedback, altering variable usage.3
Even if erroneous feedback had tended to affect confidence judgments, an ex-
amination of the results of individuals (Table 5) suggests that there may be a confi-
dence trait variable whose influence dominates. We see that on Block 1 (the pre-
test), in which feedback had not yet been given, confidence ranged from 61% to
93%. In the remainder of this section we explore how these individual differences
are reflected in relative confidence. Because the feedback manipulation had only a
minor effect, we ignore condition in the following analyses.
Absolute confidence on Block 1 might be taken as a crude measure of trait con-
fidence, if confidence can be shown to be unrelated to Block 1 performance. We re-
gressed absolute Block 1 confidence on Block 1 performance and found that they
were not correlated, r(22) = .004, suggesting that Block 1 confidence is a relatively
uncontaminated measure of the trait. We then asked whether this trait affected the
relative confidence observed on subsequent trials. We divided participants into
three groups (high, medium, and low confidence) based on absolute confidence
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FIGURE 5 Relative confidence judgments over blocks of trials for the encouraged, discour-
aged, and accurate feedback groups in Experiment 3.
3This conclusion followed primarily from an analysis of intrinsically defined performance, which was
significantly lower with false feedback than with accurate feedback, F(1, 21) = 4.981, p < .037, and the
difference got larger over blocks of trials, F(5, 105) = 6.111, p < .001. We interpret this difference as




































































judgments in Block 1. A Block (2–6) × Group ANOVA on relative confidence
(using the force-referential performance measure) showed a marginally significant
effect of trait, F(2, 21) = 2.81, p < .083. We also examined the intrinsic measure of
relative confidence. A Block × Group ANOVA revealed a significant main effect
of trait confidence, F(2, 21) = 3.88, p < .037, suggesting that relative confidence
judgments were influenced by individual differences in a systematic way. Averages
are depicted in Figure 6. The group that had the lowest absolute confidence in
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TABLE 5
Performance and Absolute Confidence for Individuals in Experiment 3
Feedback
Group/Participant
% Correct Absolute Confidence
Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest
Accurate
1 66.7 91.7 70.7 89.6
2 66.7 91.7 70.4 80.1
3 75.0 80.6 79.8 93.2
4 42.9 85.7 72.8 84.1
5 69.4 80.6 80.9 84.7
6 33.3 78.8 81.8 75.7
7 63.9 75.0 77.5 80.6
8 72.2 63.9 82.6 79.5
M 61.3 81.0 77.1 83.4
SD 14.9 9.1 5.0 5.7
Encouraged
9 71.4 85.7 71.2 79.7
10 57.1 65.7 77.0 86.6
11 74.3 82.9 80.2 87.0
12 65.7 77.1 84.7 74.7
13 51.4 71.4 86.3 83.7
14 68.6 68.6 74.3 80.6
15 51.4 71.4 61.0 74.0
16 62.9 64.7 75.2 73.4
M 62.9 73.4 76.2 78.0
SD 8.8 7.8 8.0 5.5
Discouraged
17 77.1 82.4 82.5 90.4
18 73.5 77.1 77.0 73.4
19 65.7 60.0 69.5 72.2
21 65.7 85.3 78.7 85.8
20 62.9 71.4 88.5 98.6
22 60.0 82.9 92.1 90.4
23 45.7 77.1 83.6 84.3
24 77.1 79.4 79.4 76.5
M 66.0 77.0 81.4 84.0




































































Block 1 was on average underconfident, whereas the more confident groups had an
average relative confidence in the overconfidence range.
To summarize, in Experiment 3 we attempted to manipulate confidence by giv-
ing false feedback about performance. Our goal was to establish whether factors be-
sides mode of apprehension determine confidence. That manipulation failed, but
our attention was called to large individual differences on Block 1, in which no
feedback had been given. This absolute confidence was unrelated to performance.
We observed that participants who showed high confidence on Block 1 tended to
show relative overconfidence on later blocks, whereas participants who showed
low confidence on Block 1 tended to show relative underconfidence on later
blocks. In short, trait factors, which are independent of both variable usage and
mode of apprehension, seem to affect relative confidence.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In three experiments we explored some characteristics of relative confidence to see
its strengths and weaknesses as an index of the type of processing that perceivers
engage in when they make judgments about events, as proposed by Runeson et al.
(2000). We were particularly interested in the extent to which factors other than
mode of apprehension could influence relative confidence. We reasoned that it
would be important to take such factors into account if using particular values of
relative confidence, and relative confidence in general, as an indicator of whether
a perceiver is in an inferential or direct perceptual mode.
The task we used was the judgment of relative pulling force. In Experiment 1,
we adapted the Michaels and de Vries (1998) pull-perception paradigm to permit
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FIGURE 6 Intrinsic relative confidence over blocks of trials for the low-, medium-, and





































































the evaluation of confidence; participants were asked to make categorical judg-
ments (regarding whether the pulling force was greater than or less than average)
and to estimate the confidence they had in their judgment. The results replicated
two of Runeson et al.’s (2000) basic empirical effects: that feedback improved per-
centage of correct judgments over blocks of trials and decreased the degree of rela-
tive confidence. However, we did not find average underconfidence, the hypothe-
sized hallmark of direct perception, as Runeson et al. saw on later blocks.
The higher overconfidence found in our experiment led us to propose an alter-
native explanation of the decrease in confidence. If confidence judgments are as-
sumed to veridically reflect the accuracy with which observers detect the optical
variable that they use, whatever variable that may be, they might appear overconfi-
dent before practice because they tend to use nonspecifying variables, which would
not permit accurate performance. Furthermore, overconfidence might then disap-
pear with practice merely because observers change their variable use and come to
rely on specifying variables, which permits best performance. This hypothesis was
tested in Experiment 2.
If, as argued, the average overconfidence was due to some participants’ use of
nonspecifying variables, fostering reliance on nonspecifying variables should in-
crease relative confidence. To test this, in Experiment 2 we tried to alter perfor-
mance level by giving participants feedback based on nonspecifying variables. This
manipulation succeeded in steering participants toward relying on the variable
they received feedback on, regardless of whether it specified the to-be-judged
property, force. More important, the manipulation indeed led to an increase in
overconfidence, supporting the hypothesis that the decrease in confidence in Ex-
periment 1 had been due to convergence on a specifying variable. This hypothesis
was further confirmed by the finding that no effects regarding relative confidence
were observed when we used intrinsic measures, that is, when we measured confi-
dence relative to the variables that observers appeared to use, rather than relative
to the explicit task variable.
In Experiment 3, we tried to manipulate absolute confidence directly by giving
false feedback about performance, but we did not succeed. This is, of course, en-
couraging for the use of relative confidence in distinguishing modes of apprehen-
sion because the fewer factors that influence relative confidence, the better. Unfor-
tunately, however, we observed large individual differences in absolute confidence
on Block 1, and they were not correlated with performance. We then split observ-
ers into three groups based on their absolute confidence level in Block 1. A signifi-
cant effect of group suggested that what seems to be a trait variable heavily influ-
enced the relative confidence.
To summarize, our finding that confidence judgments do not appear to merely
reflect feedback is encouraging for the use of confidence judgments in distinguish-
ing the modes of apprehension, whereas the finding of large individual difference
and the finding that the decrease in confidence can be due to convergence on spec-
ifying information are not. What are the implications of these findings concerning




































































confidence judgments for the mode transition proposed by Runeson et al. (2000)?
And, more generally, what are the implications for ecological theories of per-
ceptual learning? Before we turn to these main questions, we want to make a few
prior observations concerning task-defined versus intrinsic performance measures,
quantitative versus binary feedback, and inference versus perception.
Task-Defined Versus Intrinsic Performance Measures
The skeptic might wonder how seriously one should take conclusions based on ar-
bitrary definitions of performance. Arguably, we asked people to perform a task,
then ultimately scored their performance without attention to the explicit task. We
believe we can defend this apparently unorthodox move.
First, given that participants were asked to assess their certainty in the accuracy
of their judgments, their standard was surely whatever they were doing, irrespective
of its agreement with how we as experimenters defined success. That is, a partici-
pant presumably judges the likelihood of being correct on the basis of the at-
tended-to variable: If it is extreme (i.e., well above or below its mean), the
perceiver is likely to be confident; if it is near its mean, the perceiver is likely to be
uncertain. If the experimenter chooses a performance measure different from the
participant’s standard, relative confidence becomes a measure of the relative mis-
match between what participants are doing and what the experimenter assumes
they are doing. In that sense, one might argue that an intrinsic performance mea-
sure is less arbitrary than one rooted in explicit task demands.
How to define and measure what perceivers are doing and how well they are do-
ing it should not be considered to be a simple business. This is illustrated by Gib-
son’s (1966) arguments about the meaning of geometric illusions (see also Mi-
chaels & Carello, 1981, p. 92). When a perceiver’s judgment about the length of a
line, say in the Müller-Lyer figure, is different from the scientist’s measure, the con-
ventional interpretation is that the perceiver is in error. Gibson (1966, p. 313) re-
marked, however, that it is the scientist who is not measuring the variable that the
perceiver exploits in reporting length. Presumably, perceivers are reliably detecting
whatever they detect. Thus, finding poor performance in length estimation in a
Müller-Lyer task can be simply the result of bringing to bear an arbitrary standard.
Crisp operational definitions of performance may simplify experimental work, but
they can obscure more fundamental principles.
Quantitative Versus Binary Feedback
In our attempt to replicate Runeson et al.’s (2000) findings in the pulling-force par-
adigm, we adapted the pull-perception paradigm to Runeson et al.’s measurement
and feedback procedure. Feedback was always categorical, given as “correct” or
“incorrect.” As such, it offered a restricted range of information that did not allow
for much perceptual discrimination. A comparison of the degree of improvement




































































in (extrinsically measured) performance with the results of Michaels and de Vries
(1998) indicates that performance benefits much more from continuous than from
categorical feedback. The lack of informativeness of the categorical feedback may
have slowed the march of learning, and thus possibly the march toward under-
confidence. More learning may have led to degrees of underconfidence that were
more in line with those reported in the collision paradigm.
Perceiving Versus Inferring
Whereas the Helmholtzian tradition holds that all, or at least most, of perceiving is
a matter of inference, ecological psychologists hold that perceiving and inferring
are different, and that inferring, if it happens, is subsequent to perception. As out-
lined in the introduction, one difference that often goes together with the distinc-
tion between inferring and directly perceiving is the type of variable that the re-
spective processes are thought to rely on. Inferences are often said to be based on
so-called lower-order variables, whereas direct perception is said to be based on an-
alytically complex or higher-order variables. The mode transition hypothesis, how-
ever, refers to more than to this difference. Beyond the use of different types of vari-
ables, the mode transition refers to a qualitative distinction in the mode of
apprehension, perception being characterized by an “immediacy” and directness of
the experience of the apprehended property, and inferences being characterized as
a “reasoning” process (Runeson et al., 2000, pp. 528, 534).
Although these two distinctions—type of variable and mode of apprehension—
are often thought to go together, this need not always be the case. Perceivers could
very well detect higher-order information that specifies some property and subse-
quently engage in thought-like processes. It is equally feasible that observers have a
direct impression of, say, speed, on the basis of a variable that specifies speed, which
is often said to be a lower-order variable. More extremely, one could claim that ob-
servers perceive force, without need for inferential processing, on the basis of
speed-specifying variables (e.g., Michaels & de Vries, 1998). We argue for the inde-
pendence of mode and variable type and thus accept the possible reliance on sup-
posedly different types of variables in each perceptual mode.
One reason to view variable type and mode of apprehension as independent is
that, as widely argued, the distinction between lower-order and higher-order vari-
ables might not be viable; it might not be possible to rigorously categorize variables
as higher order and lower order. This leaves any claims that a particular mode relies
on a particular type of variable either vacuous or circular. One could get around
this critique by claiming that the mode distinction refers to specifying versus
nonspecifying variables rather than to higher- versus lower-order variables. Such a
coupling between mode of apprehension and specifying and nonspecifying vari-
ables, however, does not fare much better.
First, the all-or-none characterization of perception as related to specifying vari-
ables and inference to nonspecifying variables seems to make learning into an




































































all-or-none phenomenon. The catastrophic discovery of specifying information
abruptly shifts one from inference to perception. The ability to perceive some prop-
erty, therefore, cannot improve; it can only come into existence. Although this is
possible, our first impression would be that it would have to be an unguided
trial-and-error process.
Second, and relatedly, the identification of perception with specifying infor-
mation renders perception vulnerable to an a posteriori determination that it was
merely inference. For example, say one perceives the distance of a falling object
by exploiting the specificity of optic-array acceleration to that distance. A falling
object accelerates at 9.8 m/s2, so the optical acceleration of an object falling at
eyeheight specifies distance. Surely the discovery that gravity is other than 9.8
m/s2 in some places should not render any perception of distance that exploited
optical acceleration to have been merely inference. Similarly, perception is what
it is, and determinations that there are natural or mischievous anomalies with
the information do not change the character of perception. Leaving perception
ever open to reclassification as inference lets perception slip back into the realm
of true (and possibly even false) belief. In short, we argue that changes in
variable use, without restrictions to possibly different types of variables, can
occur in both modes of apprehension, which leads us back to one of our main
questions.
What are the implications of our results for the mode transition hypothesis pro-
posed by Runeson et al. (2000)? One of the difficulties of the mode transition hy-
pothesis is its testability. How can an experimenter tell whether an observer appre-
hends in an inferential or perceptual mode? With the testability being such a
delicate question, probably requiring several converging operations, one would
certainly hope that confidence judgments would be one such converging opera-
tion. Unfortunately, our results mainly add concern with regard to this use of confi-
dence judgments, thereby indicating that further methods to distinguish inferen-
tial and perceptual functioning are needed.
If one assumes that methods to distinguish the modes can be established, then
the mode transition theory of learning would have to face a further challenge,
namely, to explain the mode transition. That is, however complicated the basis
of the observation, it is unsatisfactory just to observe that a transition has oc-
curred. How does a transition occur? Answering this question may prove diffi-
cult. Moreover, for theories that entail a mode transition, the challenge is inevi-
table.
On a positive note, our finding that the decrease in confidence can be explained
by mere convergence on specifying variables, with perceivers performing in a direct
perceptual mode throughout, suggests that learning results such as those in the ex-
periment presented here can be addressed without resorting to a mode transition.
Our expectation is that a lawful account of how people change only in which vari-
ables they use might encounter less severe scientific challenges than an account of
how a mode transition might occur.
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